Cyber-physical systems are critical infrastructures crucial to the reliable delivery of energy and other resources, and to the stable functioning of automatic and control architectures. These systems are composed of interdependent physical, control and communications networks described by disparate mathematical models creating scientific challenges that go well beyond the modeling and analysis of the individual networks. A key challenge in cyber-physical defense is a fast online detection and localization of faults and intrusions without a prior knowledge of the failure type. We describe a set of techniques for an efficient identification of faults from correlations in physical signals, assuming that the minimal amount of information on the system is available. The performance of detection method is illustrated on data collected from a large building automation system.
INTRODUCTION
Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. Copyrights for components of this work owned by others than ACM must be honored. Abstracting with credit is permitted. To copy otherwise, or republish, to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, requires prior specific permission and/or a fee. Request permissions from permissions@acm.org. Cyber-physical systems represent physical networks, governed by the law of physics, but regulated by a control system coupled to computer networks that transmit the information required to optimize and control the physical networks for reliability and efficiency [34, 38] . Examples include, but are not limited to, smart grids, gas pipelines, civil infrastructures, autonomous automotive systems, automatic pilot avionics and process control systems. The interdependence of the cyber and physical networks makes the combined system more vulnerable to attacks; manipulation of the computer control network can leverage cyber-physical capabilities to cause damage or significantly degrade the performance of the critical infrastructure [5, 22] .
The ability to detect and localize failures or attacks represents an important step towards the design of resilient cyber-physical networks and strategies for implementation of certificates for proportional response. It is natural to expect that the indications of intrusion or misbehavior in cyber subsystem are present in anomalies in the physical network. This fact can be used for searching for outliers in the data streams collected by the sensors monitoring the state of the physical system -a well-studied problem in a wide range of application domains [19] . Although anomalous changes in individual signals can be an indication of a major failure or a crude attack, they do not capture more sophisticated scenarios of coordinated intrusions. Therefore, it is important to take into account information from the spatiotemporal correlations of anomalies of individual signals. Moreover, exploiting these correlations might enable probabilistic localization of the intruder or failure within the network, and hence serve as a basis for building a proper response.
In this article, we study the problem of detection and localization of disturbances based on the analysis of spatiotemporal correlations between physical data streams. Our goal is to develop efficient methods for detection and localization of failures within the cyber-physical system without reference to a predefined attack vector. Failure events can be very diverse, while attacks become more and more creative and sophisticated, so the detection methodologies cannot be based on scripted scenarios. Aiming for application to a broad class of cyber-physical systems, we do not exploit the specific knowledge about the topology of the underlying physical network. Though the incorporation of such information might greatly enhance the performance of the detection algorithm in some cases this information is hard to obtain or is simply unavailable. The desired requirements for the detection and localization algorithm we will develop include scalability (the number of signals and time measurements can potentially be very large), generality (we assume that the signals are heterogeneous and of diverse nature), robustness (the signals can be noisy and incomplete) and low computational complexity (to allow deployment of the algorithm in a fast online fashion).
Cyber-physical intrusion detection and response methodologies will improve at much faster rates when the development and refinement is closely coupled with real-world experimentation that validates strengths and reveals weaknesses. The simplicity and generality of the detection algorithms are very important since they will allow for deployment in different cyber-physical systems. In this paper, we test our techniques on specific real-world data from an automated HVAC system in a large building at Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL). We are planning to deploy and experimentally validate these methods on several other cyber-physical systems of importance to LANL.
We present a general protocol for detection and localization of disturbance which meet most of the aforementioned requirements. First, we develop a simple procedure for constructing a special correlation matrix out of detrended heterogeneous signals, making some assumptions on the anomaly signature we would like to be able to capture. Then, we use the correlation matrix to solve three crucial tasks: i) detection of the anomaly using spectral methods; ii) localization of a subset of anomalous nodes within the system using lowrank approximations and biclustering methods; iii) finally, identification of the functional role of the inferred anomaly based on the tag data. We validate our framework on synthetic and real-world data collected from a building automation system at LANL.
TIME SERIES ANALYSIS AND CORRE-LATION MATRIX CONSTRUCTION
We consider the problem involving data from N physical sensors indexed by V . For each sensor i ∈ V we are given a time series Xi(t) collected at times t ∈ T . The data {Xi(t)}i∈V can compromise heterogeneous real or integer valued signals and provides a (partial) description of system. We assume that the spatial and temporal relationships between the sensors are unknown, but that we do have access to sensor labels. We also assume that the fluctuations of each time series in the system around their mean behavior during normal operations are essentially independent. Formally, we say that during normal operations the observations Xi(t) can be modeled as
where the quantitiesÊ(t) = {Êi(t)}i∈V represent the random noise term and {Xi(t)}i∈V , which we call the trace, describes the idealized operation of the system without noise. A schematic representation of such a signal is illustrated in Figure 1 . On the other hand, when the system is attacked or experiences a fault, the affected parts of the system are expected to move away from the trace. Equation (1) then reads
where Si(t), the signal of fault or attack, pushes the system away from the trace. This is represented in Figure 2 which shows the combination of noise and signal parts for two idealized data streams, compared to the signal noise part of the third data stream.
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Figure 2: The blue line contains the noise part of a signal; the other two lines are made up of both noise and signal. Note that the failure signal is noticeable in the second half of the plot: the red and green lines are pushed alternatively up and down by the signal.
We are interested in those cases when the signal is nonzero for a significant subset of sensors. It may occur that for each individual sensor the failure signal is not directly observable, but that it can be detected and becomes statistically significant when the correlations over the subset of affected sensors are taken into account. In these cases, the differences between the trace and the corresponding observations will become correlated. Since {Si(t)}i∈V are likely to be correlated, we expect that the correlation relations will become apparent in the mean-detrended signals
if the signal (e.g. attack or failure) occurs at t = τ and lasts for T time steps. Our goal is to construct a suitable correlation matrix out of these time series which will enable the detection and localization of the undesirable changes in system state.
Detrending the Signals
Unfortunately, the traces {Xi(t)}i∈V are a priori unknown. In some cases it can be learned from an ensemble of repeating operations under normal behavior, but here we assume that this data might be unavailable. Thus we approximate the traces with a running mean
centered at t. This is a reasonable assumption if the traceŝ Xi are fairly smooth: in this case,Xi(t) are smothered using the points Xi(t ) for t = t−τav/2 to t+τav/2. However, this will not be a good assumption if the system changes modes of operation or otherwise undergoes rapid changes within the interval [t − τav/2, t + τav/2].
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TraceXi trailing mean centered mean observed value Figure 3 : A blowup of part of Figure 1 showing the values of centered and trailing rolling means at a fixed point. The centered rolling mean is more accurate in approximating the true trace, but requires the data points in the future.
Note that although the use of the centered running mean requires the knowledge of the signal in the future, it produces better results with respect to the approach where the trailing mean is employed, see Figure 3 . At the same time, an online detection algorithm based on centered mean will have a time-lag of τav/2. There is hence a trade off between the quality of approximation and the speed of detection.
It seems intuitive that the choice of smaller τav would introduce a smaller time-lag, and thus would lead to better results. On the other hand, τav should be large enough to average out the small fluctuations caused by the termsÊ(t). However, a similar argument requires that τav should be chosen to be close in size to the expected duration of an attack or fault signal one would like to be able to detect: if τav is much larger than this scale, the signal will be likely to be averaged out. In practice, there is often a range of reasonable choices for the length τav of the sliding window; one should choose the one which satisfies the requirements on a desired maximum time-lag of detection.
Construction of the Correlation Matrix
We calculate correlation matrices from the detrended data streams
where one more parameter must be chosen: the time interval τcorr over which correlations are calculated. Ideally, this time window corresponds to the duration of the event we would like to detect. This time length in general is application dependent; typically, we are interested in the time scales which are a low multiple of τav. Thus if the the correlation window is determined to be of length τcorr, we calculate the Pearson correlation coefficient for each pair:
where each sum is taken from t = t − τcorr to T and
This gives us the desired correlation matrix M = {ξij(t)} (ij) at each time instance. We are not interested in detecting the self-correlations which are trivially equal to one, so we put by definition ξii(t) = 0 ∀i ∈ V . From our setup, under normal operations when the data streams can be modeled as in equation (1), we expect the detrended data streams to be uncorrelated:
However during an attack or failure, when the system can be modeled as in equation (2), we expect there to be a set of sensors S ⊂ V such that
The sensors S are those which for which the non-zero signals Si(t) of the attack are similar.
DETECTION AND LOCALIZATION OF ANOMALOUS SUBMATRIX
In this section, we present a protocol for detecting and localizing a group of anomalously behaving devices within the physical network. The detection step is done by monitoring the spectral gap in the correlation matrix spectrum. We are exploring two approaches to the localization of the anomalous nodes: sparse PCA based on a low-rank approximation, and heuristic biclustering method for finding a submatrix with an elevated mean value.
Detection of Anomalous Submatrix
Under normal conditions and low noise, the correlation matrix of the physical system might contain some structural information about the topology of the system. For instance, in the case of a strong signal, we can expect to observe the communities representing the common functional role or spatial location of devices; otherwise, the matrix elements should appear as noisy and uncorrelated values, fluctuating around zero. In anomalous situation and under constructive assumptions of the section 2, in particular if the anomalous signal is sufficiently strong, one should witness the emergence of one single submatrix with a higher mean value. Similarly to the problem of detection of one community in a graph [16] , this change should be visible in the spectrum of the correlation matrix: only one eigenvalue is nonzero in the ideal noiseless case, and there should be an easy identifiable spectral gap between the first and the second largest eigenvalues in the noisy case, while the eigenvector associated to the largest eigenvector should contain information about the location of the corresponding submatrix.
This intuition for the correlation matrices constructed from the real signals comes from rigorous analysis for ideal noise, which also illustrates the concept of a "sufficiently strong signal" which has been used above. As an example, consider a rank-1 matrix with eigenvalue θ, P = θuu T , and suppose that we observe this matrix corrupted by a noise taking the form of a normalized N × N Gaussian Wigner matrix W , with zero-mean elements and variance of the offdiagonal elements equal to 1/N 2 . It is well known that the spectrum of W converges to the semi-circle law with support [−2, 2]. Let us denote the largest eigenvalue associated with the measurement matrix P + W as λ1, and the corresponding eigenvector as u1. Depending on the "signal strength" θ, the values of the largest eigenvalue and eigenvector of P + W undergoes a phase transition [2] : if θ > 1, then in the large N limit λ1 → 1 + 1/θ is clearly separated from the bulk, and | u, u1 | → 1 − 1/θ 2 ; in the opposite case θ ≤ 1, λ1 → 2 and the associated eigenvector does not carry any useful information, being completely degraded by the noise, with | u, u1 | → 0. Similar results hold for the case of the multiplicative noise.
In a typical real-world situation, the spectrum of the correlation matrix in the presence of an anomalously correlated group of devices has a form presented in the main part of Figure 4 . There is a clear gap, separating two largest eigenvectors λ1 and λ2, and the nonzero values of eigenvalues λi for i ≥ 2, sorted by the order of magnitude, is entirely due to the noise. In the case of a weak signal, however, the picture can be similar to the inset of Figure 4 , where the presence of the spectral gap ∆1 = λ1 − λ2 does not seem to be so obvious. Hence, the important question is how to decide whether the gap is statistically significant. To address this question, we suggest the following criterion. Let us denote by ∆i = λi − λi+1 -the collection of spacings between successive eigenvalues. Following the assumption that the nonzero values of all eigenvalues but the largest one are due to the noise, we can empirically estimate the corresponding characteristic scale as
Now the detection certificate is as follows. We consider that the first eigenvalue is statistically well separated if
We count the opposite (noisy) case as an absence of detection. figure) and with a weak anomalous signal (inset). In the first case, the condition (11) is satisfied, and hence we consider the outcome of the detection test as positive. In the case of weak signal, the level of noise does not allow us to conclude that an anomalous community of devices is present.
Localization Using the Low-rank Approximation
Once the detection certificate presented in Subsection 3.1 yields a positive result, the next step is to localize the anomalously correlated elements of the system. The K communities detection problem is often addressed using the low rank approximation [11] . In our case, a significant spectral gap ∆1 indicates that the hidden matrix can be localized by looking at the best rank 1 approximation M of the initial matrix M , for example with respect to the Frobenius norm:
where · F is the Frobenius norm. The solution to this old problem is well-known and is given by the singular value decomposition (SVD) of the matrix M , from which we retain only the leading singular value σ and the corresponding singular vector q [15] :
Unfortunately, in general the resulting vector q is not sparse, which does not allow us to identify the location of the anomalous nodes. Ideally, for detecting a group containing k anomalous nodes, we would like to obtain a vector with only k nonzero components, indicating their positions; this problem is often referred to as sparse PCA [12] . While under a general low-rank assumption this problem is NP-hard, for the special case of rank 1 it can be solved analytically simply by sorting the elements of q, and retaining only k largest elements [32, 41] , resulting in a vector that we denote as q k . The constant in the expression for M is then simply given by
Another difficulty comes from the fact that a priori we do not know the size of the anomalous module. Sometimes, in order to find the optimal value of k, the so-called elbow method can be used [39] . The idea is fairly simple; find the minimal k such that the quality of approximation ε k ≡ M − σ k q k q T k F is not increased "too much" when we make a step from k to k + 1. More precisely, the optimal k is given by the minimal k such that
where is some small constant, and the only parameter of the algorithm. The total complexity of the method is dominated by the complexity of the SVD-decomposition and is O(N 3 ) in the most general case. We expect the nonzero values of q k for the optimal k to indicate the location of the nodes producing anomalous correlations. However, in the examples involving real data, the cusp on the elbow diagram might be not very pronounced in hard cases (see Figure 5 for an example), therefore, in practice it can be unclear how to select . At the same time it should be noted that ultimately we are not necessarily interested in inferring the whole subset of anomalous nodes, but rather in understanding the cause of the anomaly. In this sense, one can choose an arbitrary small value of , threshold at a certain reasonable k * √ N , representing a practically achievable bound on the size of detectable community [20, 13] , and then analyze the corresponding group consisting of k * devices using the tag data. We will use this approach in experimental tests, choosing k * √ N . 
Localization via Biclustering Method
In this Section we discuss a different efficient algorithm for the localization of the anomalous subgraph of the physical network, which does not use the rank 1 assumption, but instead attempts to find a large average submatrix. We use a variant of the algorithm of [35] to find a k × k submatrix with an elevated mean, which follows the scheme: 1. Select k columns of M at random; 2. Iterate until convergence:
Algorithm 1 Detection and localization of faults
Input: N time series {Xi}i∈V , recorded in real time
Correlation matrix: compute {Ei(t)}i∈V and M = {ξij(t)} (ij) as described in Section 2. Detection: check for the condition (11) ∆1 > ∆2 + δ.
if
This algorithm is guaranteed to converge to a local minimum, meaning that the resulting submatrix can not be improved by changing only its column or row set. In order to get the best resulting submatrix, we use a multi-start procedure, initializing the biclustering algorithm L times for given k, and retain the most significant submatrix.
Like in the low-rank method presented in the previous Section 3.2, the size of the researched subgraph k is unknown. In this case, again, we use k * √ N in order to find a smaller submatrix, representing the nodes which belong to the anomalous group of devices.
If the tag data (nodes label) and/or additional topological information is available, one should be able to infer a possible cause of the failure by looking at the common factor uniting the selected nodes. In most cases, the selected basic devices are coupled to a single functional model or to a particular controller. The proposed algorithm is summarized in Algorithm 1.
EXPERIMENTS
We perform experiments using the detection and localization algorithm described above on synthetic and collected real data. Prior to running tests on a real-world test platform, we examine the detection procedure on artificiallygenerated signals, represented by a mixture of correlated and uncorrelated random walks.
Synthetic Data
In this section, we present results in the ideal situation, where we have a full control on the degree of correlation between synthetic signals. We generate N = 900 artificial signals as random walks with randomly chosen starting positions; k0 = 50 of them are correlated and represent an anomalous subgroup we would like to detect and identify. Uncorrelated random walks are lazy: with probability p0 = 0.9, its position at time Xi(t + 1) remains unchanged with respect to the previous time step Xi(t), and with probability p± = 0.05 two positions separated by one time step satisfy Xi(t + 1) = Xi(t) ± 1. Correlated random walks are constructed as follows: they are related to one of the random walks (called master random walk), at each time step independently repeating the step of the master random walk with probability ρ = 0.5, and otherwise behaving as an uncorrelated random walk at this time step; see Figure 6 for an example of five signals generated in this way.
Let us now show the performance of Algorithm 1 on this artificial signal ensemble. First, we detrend the data and construct the correlation matrix M in the way described in Section 2; we choose τcorr = 200, and the running mean is taken over the window τav = 10 time steps. The spectrum of M is presented in the inset of the Figure 6 and triggers positive detection of anomaly according to the criterion (11) .
Next, we run the localization algorithms presented in Sections 3.2 and 3.3. We find that for k * = √ N = 30, both algorithms perfectly identify a subgroup of 30 correlated signals. If we choose to search the correlated group with the (unknown) ground truth size k0 = 50, then the lowrank approximation approach misidentifies 5 signals, correctly counting the other 45 as correlated. The biclustering method makes only one mistake in this case; however, it requires a rather large number of warm starts (L 3 · 10 4 ) in order to converge to the best solution, which makes the algorithm slightly slower compared to the SVD-based one. As we will see in the next section, the speed of convergence is a very important property for the online deployment of the algorithm.
Case Study with Real Data
System Description
Large commercial air conditioning (AC) systems represent an attractive cyber-physical test case for fault detection and localization algorithms because they contain relatively sophisticated physical, control and communications architectures, and the available tag data can serve as a ground truth for discovered groups and modules. We collected and analyzed the data streams from the AC system in a 30 000 m 2 office building, with about 300 sensors located in the conditioned spaces. These sensors record local temperature, airflow and valve opening positions. See Figure 7 for a schematic representation of the system used in this study, which shares a common structure with a large number of commercial AC systems. A more in depth discussion of this AC layout is provided in the references [1, 18] . Altogether this constitutes a system of approximately 1000 data heterogeneous data streams, sampled once per minute. Figure 7 : A schematic representation of air conditioning (AC) system used in this work. The AC system includes two sets of loops: a water loop circulating water between the chiller and the air-to-water heat exchangers, and the air loops, where the fans in the air handling units (AHU) force the warm return air through the heat exchangers, and the cooled air is then delivered to the variable air volume (VAV) units. Thermostats (T) throughout the system provide input to the controllers that regulate the air flows supplied to the VAVs. The recorded temperature, airflow and valve opening position signals from all the sensors and fans are used as data streams to our fault detection and localization algorithm.
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The variable air volume (VAV) units represent the air inlets to the cooled spaces, containing valves that regulate the chilled air flowing to the conditioned space. Different VAVs spatially close to each other are connected to a common air handling unit (AHU). A pressure sensor at the fans output provides an input to to a local control loop that regulates the electrical fan power to fix the fan pressure output. A network representation of a part of the physical system including conditioned spaces, fans and controllers is drawn in Figure 8 ; this data has been extracted from the tag data accompanying the recorded signals. This figure takes into account the spatial layout of conditioned rooms, and gives an idea of physical and communication links in the system.
Due to a conflict of local control loops, one of the fans (fan 6 in the figure 8) in this building is behaving anomalously: at certain times of the day, it produces an uncontrolled oscillating behavior. Although this action is not a result of a cyber attack, it represents a perfect test for the protocol aiming at detection and localization of failures: we expect that these oscillations should leave a signature in the correlations of related physical signals, while the signal is too weak to be visible and identified as an outlier in individual recorded signals. This anomalous behavior in the system is a proxy for attacks of the control architecture that can occur due to vulnerabilities of the cyber part of the network. In what follows, we demonstrate the performance of our detection certificate, using the described fan 6 oscillations as a failure event that we would like to detect and identify.
Detection Algorithm Performance
In Figure 9 , we show examples of our data stream. The left plot of Figure 9 shows an anomalous behavior of fan 6, and three examples of temperature measurements in three conditioned spaces, two of which are serviced by fan 6, and one being unrelated. The right plot shows examples of other signals of different nature (airflow and valve positions) that we use for tests. The analysis of individual signals do not allow us to detect an anomalous behavior and to relate it to the malfunctioning fan 6, and therefore we follow the procedure described in Section 2, constructing the correlation matrix and attempting to detect the anomaly from correlations of physical signals.
Let us first demonstrate the performance of the detection algorithm, described in Section 3.1. In Figure 10 , we show the spectra of the correlation matrices M in four different situations: i) fan 6 active, and all signals included; ii) fan 6 active, and signals serviced by fan 6 removed from the data; iii) fan 6 inactive, all signals included; iv) special type of activity of fan 6, when the oscillations with large period are occurring smoothly on a long scale (of order of a half-day). It is clear that only case i) should trigger a positive detection outcome. Indeed, we notice that only the spectrum in this case satisfies the condition (11) , while all other situations yield a negative detection result. The matrix M in each case has been constructed using the parameters τav = 30 min and τcorr = 200 min.
Once the presence of anomaly is detected, we compare the performance of localization algorithms: is it possible to correctly identify the group of nodes related to the anomalous fan, and hence to infer the reason of misbehavior. Tables  1 and 2 demonstrate localization results for two values of group sizes: the ground truth k0 = 209, which is in general unknown, and for k * = 30 strongest signals, following the strategy outlined in Section 3.2, as a function of different combinations of τav and τcorr. As it has been explained in Section 2, little relevant information is captured with small τav, and indeed we find that τav = 10 does not lead to a positive detection, see Table 2 . The best results are obtained for larger values of τcorr, where more data is incorporated in the correlation matrix.
One of the major requirements for the algorithms is the ability to perform online detection and localization; new data points arrive every minute, so we would like the localization algorithms to converge in several seconds. The low-rank algorithm is very fast, and does not need any adjustments. As it has been already discussed in the previous section, in biclustering algorithm we are forced to limit the number of warm starts to 1000 for the size k0 and to 10000 for k * in order to meet the computation complexity requirement, since the convergence time of biclustering procedure grows with k. Another important property of biclustering is that unlike in the low-rank approximation, the identities of the discovered columns does not always match the identity of the discovered rows; we use only one of the subsets to compute the number of mismatches. With these restrictions, both algorithms produce similar results with a comparable speed (under 10 seconds for the present case). In general, while only a half of true nodes are discovered for the ground truth group size value k0, the k * strongest signals in almost all cases belong to a subgroup of a true group related to the anomalous fan. This value is sufficient to determine the common functional role of nodes inside this group, which corresponds to their relation to the anomalous fan 6 in this case study. Therefore, both algorithms satisfy the requirements of performance, simplicity and scalability, which make them appropriate for deployment in real cyber-physical systems.
RELATED WORK
Defense of cyberphysical systems: In the past several years, the discovery methods for detecting and localizing failures and attacks have attracted a significant attention [34, 38, 37, 30] . Indeed, the defense of cyber-physical systems is a crucial topic from the point of view of economic security [5, 22] . The major complications are coming from a high degree of influence of the sensor data by the seasonal changes, proximity correlations and operational switches, and from the fact that infrastructure operators do not always have an accurate model of the physical network, or the existing models are not integrated into unified cyberphysical system model [37] . Another important factor is an increasing size and complexity of the systems under considerations [36] . Some of the previous works develop detection techniques based on an accurate system modeling and on accounting for different attack scenarios [30] . In this work, we focus on the conditions for a successful detection of failures and intrusions assuming restricted available information on the system. Signal detrending: Aiming at general applications, we have used a simple running-mean signal detrending procedure in Section 2, although other techniques can be employed to this end. The goal of detrending any time series [X(t)] τ +T t=τ is to decompose the signal into a superposition of simpler pieces. There are a wide array of detrending methods [4, 3, 14, 17, 23, 8, 7, 21] , and each have associated strengths and weaknesses. These detrending methods assume the time series is stationary which is most often achieved with a regression-line fit to the observed time series. After removing this trend the residual time series is evaluated for stationarity (i.e. EX(t) = EX(t + τ ) ; τ ∈ N ) using a Dickey-Fuller test [4, 3, 14] . A stationary signal can be further decomposed by assuming it follows a linear autoregressive process [4, 3] . An auto-regressive process is one that supposes the signal at time t is a linear addition of the signal sampled at past time points X(t) = i=t−1 aiX(i).
More data-driven approaches considered for detrending a times series are exponential-smoothing [17, 23] , and in particular Holt-Winters methodology [7] . Exponential and Holt-Winters smoothing detrend the time series by assuming the signal at time t is made up of past observations weighted by a geometrically decreasing parameter α ∈ (0, 1) such that X(t) = αX(t − 1) + (1 − α)st−1 where st−1 is the cumulative sum of past weighted observations from t = 0 [17, 23] .
More recently Empirical Mode Decomposition, which detrends a signal into its intrinsic modes, was proposed [21] . These intrinsic modes can be thought of as empiricallyconstructed basis functions for the time series. Autoregressive models can be very powerful for detrending time series, but their weakness lies in the assumption the times series is a linear sum of its past samples. On the other hand, datadriven approaches make less stringent assumptions on the model imposed, but suffer from choosing the correct parameters to accurately detrend a signal.
Outliers detection: Anomaly detection is an important field with application to a wide number of domains (see [6] for a general survey). A large number of methods have been suggested, including network [40] and time series [19] specific techniques. A general formulation of the anomaly detection problem often takes form of hypothesis testing by considering H0 (absence of anomaly) versus H1 (presence of anomaly). In the present work, the hypothesis H1 has been formulated as follows: if the correlation matrix is constructed and normalized in such a way that the normally behaving correlations fluctuate around zero, then there exist a submatrix with elements having a deviating mean [29] . This task is directly related to the problem of finding hidden cliques and community detection in graphs [16] .
Optimal denoising: Real-world correlation matrices are noisy, and in general it is not sufficient to work directly with the observed data. One should develop techniques for extracting a useful signal from the signal-plus-noise matrix, the procedure also known as denoising which appears in many machine learning [24] , signal processing [33] and classification applications [25] . Moreover, in reality the signal matrix might have no special structure, while the form of the noise term is in general unknown. Several studies have explored the problem of the effective rank estimation of the signal matrix by optimal thresholding of singular values [31, 9] .
Structure learning of the underlying network: It is natural to expect that the defense of cyber-physical systems can be enhanced by including topological information on the underlying network. This knowledge can also considerably facilitate the anomaly detection procedure. In some particular cases, the network can be reconstructed from the data if such location information is not available, although practically the problem appears to be very hard, especially in the setting where the use of fast online algorithms is desired. The problem of network reconstruction from observed data has attracted a considerable attention in diverse contexts. In the setting most closely related to ours, when the model and its dynamics is unknown, several reconstruction methods can still be useful. A remarkable result [10] states that if the network is a tree, it can be perfectly reconstructed from the matrix of pairwise mutual information, computed from the signals. Unfortunately, in the case of general time series representing continuous signals, even under perfect noiseless conditions, the amount of data required for an accurate estimate of the mutual information turns out to be unrealistically excessive; bounding the mutual information using first and second moments [26] may lead to very wrong reconstruction results. Under some assumptions on the form of the signals, e.g. working with Gaussian models, it is possible to carry out the network reconstruction problem in the case of continuous signals [27] using the information contained in the covariance matrix. For general heterogeneous signals, the problem remains essentially unsolved. The presence of hidden nodes, even in the case of a known network and a simple dynamic model, complicates the problem to the point where it becomes intractable for systems of large size [28] .
CONCLUSIONS
In this work we explored a set of methods for detection and localization of failures in cyber-physical systems, based on the analysis of correlations between physical time series. The established protocol enables the identification of a group of anomalously behaving sensors, providing insight for the localization of the failure source. The developed detection procedure achieves a number of important requirements, including low computational complexity and simplicity of implementation. Our capability to access the cyber-physical demonstration system, described in the article, to collect and analyze data from this system, and to deploy the presented detection algorithm opens a path forward for the future work. We are planning to perform real-world experiments which will consist in attacking the building cyber network and manipulating the control system in a known manner; this will allow us to further validate the presented methods. Another direction that we intend to explore consists in combining the control communication data on the cyber side of the network in order to minimize the possibility of false detections and to enhance the quality of failure source localization. These developments are essential for development of algorithms for proportional response and for designing resilient cyber-physical networks.
We are planning to make the dataset and algorithmic implementation used in this work available at the moment of submission of the camera ready version of the article.
